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Abstract:  While many experiments demonstrate that actual behavior is 
different than predicted behavior, they have not shown that economic 
reasoning is necessarily incorrect.  Instead, these experiments illustrate 
that the problem with homo economicus is that his preferences have been 
mis-specified.  Modeled with social preferences, agents who forgo material 
gains can often be called rational. The current experiment illustrates this 
point with an example.  Assuming self-interested agents, punishment is 
not credible in social dilemmas, yet people are often willing to incur costs 
to punish free riders.  Despite this seeming irrationality, we show that 
these same people react to changes in the price of punishing and income 
as if punishment was an ordinary and normal good. 
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Introduction 
 
At this point in the evolution of experimental and behavioral economics 
laboratory experiments have provided more new questions about 
economic behavior than answers.  Instead of confirming the standard 
tenets of neoclassical economics, experiments have identified decision-
making anomalies (Camerer [1995]), preference reversals (Tversky et al. 
[1990]), and non-standard or “social” preferences (Camerer and Fehr 
[2001], Carpenter [2001], Charness and Rabin [2001]).
1  Expanding on the 
area of social preferences, experiments have shown that, instead of 
everyone being selfish and myopic, the average participant is much better 
described as trusting and trustworthy (Berg et al. [1995]), fair (Gueth et 
al. [1982], Fehr et al. [1993]), and cooperative (Isaac et al. [1984]), but 
also vindictive (Camerer and Thaler [1995], Fehr and Gaechter [2000]). 
  Notice, however, that the fact that many economic models 
predict behavior that is at odds with what we observe in experiments 
may be because we have misspecified peoples’ preferences not because the 
methodology of economics is fundamentally flawed.  Although people 
behave as if they have preferences for cooperation and retaliation, they 
may still react to incentives in ways predicted by standard economic 
logic.  For example, if we hypothesize that peoples’ observed preferences 
for cooperation operate like preferences for more standard consumption 
goods, then we might expect people to cooperate less when the implied 
price of cooperation increases just as they tend to buy fewer ordinary 
goods when the price increases. 
  In addition to being predisposed to cooperate, recent experiments 
have demonstrated that people retaliate against perceived injustices, even 
                                            
1 In fact, competitive markets is one of the few areas where experiments have 
come close to confirmed existing theories (Davis and Holt [1993]).   2 
when doing so is costly and the benefits of doing so are small.  This 
evidence (reviewed below) leads one to believe that many participants 
have a preference for punishing asocial behavior.  In the experiment 
reported on herein, we use standard tools to test, in a controlled setting, 
whether such a nonstandard preference behaves according standard 
economic reasoning. 
  This research is unique because it is the first to explicitly 
examine whether standard economic tools can explain behavior 
motivated by the nonstandard preference to punish free riders.  However, 
this research is linked to other recent work in behavioral economics.  One 
area of research examines the sacrifices that people are willing to endure 
to assure fair outcomes and, in this sense, examines the price 
responsiveness of fairness preferences.  Examples of this literature include 
Eckel and Grossman [1996], Suleiman [1996], and Zwick and Chen [1999].  
In a second related project, James Andreoni and his coauthors (Andreoni 
and Vesterlund [2001], Andreoni and Miller [2002]) empirically recover 
utility functions that are based on social preferences from observed 
behavior.  Variants of these utility functions could, in principle, generate 
the sort of demand for punishment functions that we estimate from the 
current data. 
  We proceed by briefly reviewing the literature on social dilemma 
experiments in which players were given the opportunity to punish each 
other.  Hopefully, this review will convince the reader that cooperation 
and retaliation are robust behaviors.  We then discuss the current 
experiment which was designed to examine whether peoples’ preferences 
for punishment behave according to standard economic logic.  Specifically, 
the experiment provides us with data which we use to estimate the 
demand for punishment.  Our analysis indicates that punishment is both 
ordinary and normal, but is also relatively inelastic with respect to both 
price and income.   3 
Fairness, Cooperation, and Punishment 
 
The first evidence of a preference for punishing asocial behavior came 
from one-shot ultimatum games in which a first-mover makes an offer to 
share a sum of money with a second-mover who accepts or rejects this 
offer (Gueth et al. [1982], Camerer and Thaler [1995]).  Although any 
division of the pie can be supported as an equilibrium of this game, 
subgame perfection leads one to expect that the first-mover will receive 
all (or almost all) of the money because selfish second-movers will always 
accept small offers rather than reject them and get nothing.  Despite this 
unambiguous prediction, nearly all small offers are rejected and the most 
common explanation given by second-movers is that they are retaliating 
against greedy first-movers (Pillutla and Murnighan [1996]). 
  Punitive behavior has also been witnessed in social dilemma 
games in which individual and group incentives are at odds, and 
therefore, free-riding is expected from selfish players.  One of the first of 
these experiments was conducted by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues 
(Ostrom et al. [1992]).  In this common pool resource experiment players 
cooperate with each other by not extracting too much from an open-
access and subtractable resource.  Resource use is problematic because by 
extracting, one player imposes a negative externality on all the other 
players.  Under these incentives, the authors showed that when costly 
punishment was allowed cooperative players used it to regulate the 
behavior of over-extractors (i.e. free riders) and the gross efficiency of 
extraction increased, especially when communication was allowed too. 
  Considering positive rather than negative externalities, Fehr and 
Gaechter [2000] tested whether costly punishment could curtail free 
riding in a public goods experiment.  In the voluntary contribution 
mechanism players emit a positive externality every time they contribute 
to a group project, the benefits of which are shared by the entire group.    4 
Given this structure, selfish players should contribute nothing and free 
ride on the contributions of others.  Fehr and Gaechter’s results mirror 
those of Ostrom et al. [1992] in that they find that many contributors are 
willing to pay to punish those who contribute less than the average.   
Further, the (theoretically incredible) threat to punish reduces free riding 
dramatically.  These results suggest that when subjects punish free riders 
they are expressing a social preference for retaliation because they punish 
despite having to pay to do so and despite the negligible material 




While the following experiment is based on the voluntary contribution 
mechanism (Isaac et al. [1984]), to test whether we can explain 
punishment in terms of standard economic logic we made a few changes.  
Our changes were designed to provide us with the data to estimate the 
demand for punishment.  First, we allowed players to monitor and 
punish each other.  Second, punishment was costly to impose and the 
price of punishment changed during the course of the experiment.  This 
feature allows us to estimate the price elasticity of the demand for 
punishment.  Third, the level of provision of the public good during each 
round determines an income for each player from which players paid to 
punish each other.  This feature allows us to estimate the income 
elasticity of demand.  Also note that because players’ earnings and the 
price of punishment varied over the course of the experiment we are able 
to analyze the demand for punishment using a (more powerful) within 
subject design.  The specifics of our experiment are as follows. 
Define the price of punishment, r, as the amount a punisher 
must pay, in experimental monetary units (EMUs), to remove one EMU 
from the target.  Our experiment was 15 periods long and each session   5 
was split into five blocks, each block lasting three periods. The price of 
punishment varied from block to block such that r∈{0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4}.  
We ran two treatments to balance the effect of changing prices.  In the 
decreasing price treatment r equaled 4 for the first three periods, 
meaning the punisher spent 4 EMUs to remove 1 EMU from the target, r 
equaled 2 in periods four through six, and so on until in periods thirteen 
through fifteen the price was 0.25.  In the increasing price treatment r 
started at 0.25 and cycled upward to 4.  Our players were randomly 
assigned to a treatment and we ran a total of six sessions (three for each 
treatment).  This design resulted in a total of 18 four-person groups. 
We used the familiar strangers protocol (Andreoni [1988]) under 
which players are randomly reshuffled from group to group at the 
beginning of each period because we wanted to control for any strategic 
reasons to punish.  For example, players may perceive that they would 
benefit later if they also anticipate that punishment will cause free riders 
to contribute more in the future.  However, if the target of one’s 
punishment is likely to be in a different group next period, the expected 
benefit of punishing is negligible.  Controlling for strategic punishment is 
important because doing so allows us to focus on punishment as the 
expression of a social preference. 
The payoff function for the voluntary contribution mechanism 
was augmented to account for punishment.
2  Imagine groups of n players, 
each of whom can contribute any fraction of their w EMU endowment to 
a public good and keep the rest.  Say player i free rides at rate 01 i σ <<  
and contributes  (1 ) i w σ − to the public good, the benefits of which are 
shared equally among the members of the group.  
Each player’s contribution was revealed to one other player in 
                                            
2   The instructions (see the appendix) referred to “reductions” with no 
interpretation supplied.   6 
the group who could punish this person at a price of r EMUs per 
sanction. Let rsij be the expenditure on sanctions assigned by player i to 
player j and let ski be the sanctions player i receives from player k (the 
instructions explicitly mentioned that j≠k), then the payoff to player i is 
 
[( 1 ) ]s ii i j k i wn m r s πσ σ − =+− −  
 
where  () / i n σσ ≡ ∑   is the average free riding rate in the group. The 
variable  m is the marginal per capita return on contributions to the 
public good (see Ledyard [1995]).  In all sessions n equaled 4, m was set 
to 0.5, and w was 25 EMUs. 
Because  1 1 m n <<   the game without punishment is a social 
dilemma: group incentives are at odds with individual incentives.  Each 
contributed EMU returns only 0.5 to the contributor which means free 
riding is a dominant strategy.  But if  1 σ = then everyone free rides fully 
and each player’s payoff is lower than it would be if everyone contributed 
fully.  The game is finitely repeated which implies that subgame 
perfection predicts complete free riding on every round. 
  Notice that adding the possibility of punishment does not change 
the subgame perfect prediction.  Because sanctions are costly to impose 
and any potential benefits from getting a free rider to contribute cannot 
be fully internalized by the punisher, punishment is incredible and 
therefore can not be a component of any subgame perfect equilibrium.   
Without credible punishment, free riding is still subgame perfect. 
  As noted above, each player monitored and was able to sanction 
only one other member of the group.  This design feature was added to 
control for any possible strategic or coordination reasons that might 
affect players’ punishing propensities.  For example, if each player 
monitors and can punish all the other members of the group, there are at   7 
least two problematic scenarios that may arise.  First, from a strategic 
perspective, a player may be less likely to punish a free rider because she 
thinks she can free ride on the punishment of others.  Second, a player 
may be less likely to punish because she can not explicitly coordinate her 
punishment efforts with the rest of her group.  For example, she may feel 
that the free rider should be punished, but also that there is an 
appropriate level of punishment that fits the infraction.  If she does not 
know, or can not estimate, how much others will punish she may 
withhold sanctions to be sure that the punishment does not exceed the 
offense.  If each player sees only one other player and knows that the 
person they are monitoring is not monitoring them, we control for any 
strategizing and coordination problems.  People should only pay to 
punish if they wish to express their preferences. 
 
Overview of the Data 
 
We recruited 72 participants (36% were female) in our six experimental 
sessions.  Participants earned an average of $26.26, including a $5 show-
up fee.  The typical session lasted a little less than an hour.  We begin 
our analysis by giving the reader a broad sense of the data and then we 
focus on our estimates of the demand for punishment. 
  By reviewing previous punishment experiments (e.g. Fehr and 
Gaechter [2000]) we see that the typical time path of contributions, 
averaging across treatments, starts near half the endowment and then 
increases at a decreasing rate.  However, as seen in Carpenter [2002], 
punishment has less of an effect on contributions when players only 
monitor a subset of their group-mates.  Figure 1 illustrates the time 
paths from the current experiment.  In one sense our contributions data 
look similar to the other limited monitoring data because contributions 
do not increase monotonically.  However, in another sense the current   8 
data is markedly different because there seems to be a treatment effect. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 
  The treatment effect in our contributions data makes sense from 
an economic point of view.  When the price of punishment starts at a 
relatively low level and then increases over the course of the experiment, 
contributions fall steadily and more dramatically than when the price is 
constant (as in Carpenter [2002]).  One explanation, which we will 
confirm below, is that our players based their punishment decisions on 
price, as well as, on how egregiously the target free rode.  On the one 
hand, when the price increased over time players bought less punishment 
causing the threat of punishment to abate.  This lead to more free riding.  
On the other hand, when the price fell over time players responded by 
buying more punishment per offense.  In this case, the effectiveness of 
punishment increased over the course of the experiment and, although we 
see an initial drop in contributions, they recover as the price of 
punishment continues to fall. 
  Figure 2 presents the time paths of the average expenditure on 
punishment.  Even though this graph does not control for other factors 
that might have affected our players’ punishment decisions (e.g. income 
or average level of free riding), it provides evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that players reacted to the price of punishment and this 
affected the credibility of punishment and the level of contributions.  As 
the price increased, our players spent less on punishment.  In fact, by the 
last three rounds of the increasing price treatment when it cost 4 EMUs 
to remove 1 EMU from the target, the players stopped punishing 
completely.  In the other treatment, as the price fell, players spent more 
on, and bought more, punishment. 
  Because the instructions explicitly mentioned the order in which   9 
the price of punishment would change (see the appendix), one might 
worry that players anticipated and reacted in advance to the direction of 
the price change.  For example, in the increasing price treatment, it 
might be reasonable to think that players spent more on early 
punishment than they would have had they not known that the price 
was going to increase.  Or, players in the decreasing price treatment 
might have delayed punishment to later rounds when they knew it would 
be cheaper.  If this is true then the slopes of the graphs in figure two are 
steeper than they would have otherwise been. 
  Because we do not want to detract from our main purpose of 
estimating the demand for punishment by explicitly modeling player 
expectations, we will present evidence indicating that expectations did 
not affect players’ choices.  In both treatments, the per sanction price of 
punishment was 1 EMU during periods 7, 8, and 9.  If expectations 
played a significant role then, by the above logic, we would not expect 
expenditures in the two treatments to be the same, controlling for the 
amount of free riding.  If the expenditures per offense are the same then 
we have evidence that expectations did not matter.  When we calculate 
the ratio of the expenditure on punishment to the amount kept by the 
target during these three rounds and then compare these ratios between 
treatments, we find no significant difference using either the Wilcoxon 
test or the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Z=0.77, p=0.44; ks=0.05, p=0.99).   
 
The Demand for Punishment 
 
  We now proceed by econometrically estimating a demand for 
punishment equation.  One valuable benefit of using an experiment to 
elicit the data for our estimation is that we control for most of the 
problems that typically plague demand estimates.  Specifically, 
simultaneity and identification are not problems for us because price is,   10
by design, completely exogenous.  However, we do face other issues.   
Because our experiment is 15 periods long, we generate a panel of data.  
To control for individual heterogeneity, all our regressions include 
random effects.  Because there are a lot of observations where our players 
showed no preference for punishment, our dependent variable, the 
quantity of punishment purchased, is truncated from below at zero.  For 
this reason, we use the Tobit procedure. 
  Before we present the fully controlled estimate of the demand for 
punishment, we present the reader with a graphical presentation of the 
main result.  Figure 3 illustrates an uncontrolled demand for punishment 
function.  In figure 3 observations are represented by numbers which 
indicate the average amount contributed by the targets who received the 
designated amount of punishment at the corresponding price.  Further, 
the size of each number is determined by how many observations there 
are at each location. For example, there are a lot of observation where 
the price of punishment was 0.25 and the quantity was 0.  Considering 
all these observations, the average contribution by the targets was 13 
EMUs.  Likewise, there was one case in which the punisher purchased 22 
units of punishment at a price of 1 to direct at a person in his or her 
group who contributed only 3 EMUs. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
  Figure 3 illustrates three facts about the demand for punishment.  
First, by the size of the numbers we see along the quantity equals zero 
axis, most players were not punished.  In fact 78% of our observations 
were for zero punishment.  However this makes sense given the value of 
these numbers.  The average contribution across sessions and periods is 
7.57 EMUs and, based on Fehr and Gaechter [2000], we know that 
punishment is directed, primarily, at those who contribute less than the   11
average.  Second, notice that, for any given price, as one reads up to 
higher quantities of purchased punishment, one reads smaller valued 
numbers.  This fact demonstrates that punishment is proportional to how 
much one free rides.  Third, and most importantly for our purposes, the 
regression line indicates that punishment exhibits the standard 
substitution effect: as the price increases, people punishment less. 
  We can demonstrate the robustness of figure 3 by considering 
the regression results presented in table 1.  We build our econometric 
model in three stages.  In stage one we estimate the uncontrolled price 
and income elasticities.  In stage two we add controls for how much the 
target contributed (the null hypothesis being one is punished less the 
more one contributes), and for how much the punisher contributed (the 
null, in this case, being that people who contribute more, punish more).  
Finally, in stage three we control for the time trend apparent in our data 
(i.e. figures 1 and 2) by modeling a simple dynamic which says that the 
amount of punishment purchased in period t is a function of the change 
in group cooperativeness between periods t-1 and t.
3 
  In the upper half of table 1 we report the coefficients and 
standard errors of our regressions and in the bottom half we report 
elasticities calculated at the regressor means.
4  Equation (1) introduces 
                                            
3 Notice that we could have included period fixed effects as an alternative to 
modeling a dynamic, but this approach would be incorrect because doing so 
assumes there are time idiosyncrasies while what we need to control for appears 
to be a dynamic process. 
4 Calculating elasticities from tobit coefficients is not straightforward because, 
when one calculates the marginal effect, one has to account for the probability 
that a change in the regressor will push one past the “kink,” and the impact of a 
change in the regressor on the dependent variable, given it is uncensored.   
However, we can use the McDonald and Moffitt [1980] decomposition to calculate 
elasticities.  With latent variable, pit we have the following marginal effect. 
** * (|) P r ( 0 ) (|, 0 ) ** * (| , 0 ) P r ( 0 )
Ep x p Ep x p ii i iii Ep x p p ii i i xx x it it it
∂∂ > ∂ >
=> • + > •
∂∂ ∂
   12
our main result.  Both the price and income elasticities are negative 
which indicates that, given the average participant prefers to punish free 
riders, people react to economic incentives in what economists would 
consider reasonable fashion.  However demand appears to be inelastic 
with respect to price and elastic with respect to income.  Specifically, a 
one percent increase in price reduces the quantity of punishment 
demanded by 0.90 percent and a one percent increase in income decreases 
the amount of punishment demanded by 1.24 percent.  In sum, 
punishment is ordinary and inferior according to our simplest model.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
  Equation (2) indicates that only one of our initial elasticity 
estimates is robust to the inclusion of other punishment determinants.  
Part of the variation in punishment previously attributed to changes in 
price is actually caused by changes in how egregiously the target free 
rides and how much the punisher contributed, but the coefficient remains 
negative and highly significant.  At the same time, there is a dramatic 
change in our estimate of the income elasticity.  There is a simple 
explanation for the change in the sign of the marginal effect of income.  
Income and Target’s Contribution are correlated (rho=0.63).  Without 
controlling for the target’s contribution, the income regressor picks up 
the variation due to both how much the target free rides and how much 
income is generated by the group.  Because free riders are punished less 
the more they contribute and because punishers sanction more when 
their incomes increase, the combined effect is negative and results in the 
inferior characterization of punishment in equation (1). 
We now find that punishment is normal, and inelastic with 
respect to income – a one percent increase in income increases the 
amount of punishment purchased by 0.89 percent.  We also find that a   13
one percent increase in the contribution made by the target reduces the 
amount of punishment he or she can expect by 0.62 percent and a one 
percent increase in the amount that the punisher contributes to the 
group account increases the amount he or she will punish by 0.58 percent.   
  In equation (3) we test whether our elasticity estimates are 
robust to an accounting of the trend in group cooperativeness.  As the 
reader can see, controlling for the dynamic effect of contributions on 
punishment has little effect on any of the elasticities.  Finally, in an 
unreported regression, we allowed for the fact that punishers tend to 
sanction those who give less than them more severely than those who 
give more.  Although we find evidence to this effect (as do Falk et al. 
[2001]), namely the marginal effect on those who contribute less is 0.16 
(p<0.01) and the marginal effect on those who contribute more is 0.08 
(p<0.01), the price and income marginal effects change by less than 5%, 
and therefore the elasticities are also relatively unchanged.  We conclude 
that the demand for punishment is ordinary and normal, but inelastic.
  
 
A Slutsky Decomposition 
 
Averaging across periods, treatments, and individuals those participants 
who punished spent 14% of their per period income on sanctions.  Given 
this is a significant fraction of their earnings, a change in the price of 
punishment has a dramatic effect on their real budget constraints in the 
experiment.  For this reason, we would like to further decompose our 
data to ascertain how much of the change in behavior attributed to a 
change in price is due to an income effect that is not picked up in our 
income elasticity, and how much is due to a pure substitution effect.   
 
Figure 4 about here 
   14
  Consider the choice between punishment, s, and a composite 
good,  x.  As above, the price of punishment is r  and the per period 
income is π.  Lastly, assume the composite good is normalized to be the 
numeraire. In figure 4, we derive the substitution effect by isolating the 
change in s resulting from an adjustment in the participant’s income 
after a reduction in r.  Income is adjusted so that the pre-change chosen 
bundle (s*, x*), purchased for π*, is just affordable.  This change will be 
due entirely to the change in the price of punishment.  We calculate the 
income effect by multiplying the needed income change by the marginal 
effect of income on the choice of s.  In other words, differentiating the 
identity, 
 
(,* ,* ) (, * * )
s s rs x srr s x ≡+  
 
and rearranging terms, where s
s is the Slutsky demand function for 
punishment, leads to the following punishment price effect decomposition. 
 
( , *) ( , *, *) ( , *)
*










The first term is the total effect of a change in the price of punishment 
(i.e. the observed change is s), the first term after the equal sign is the 
substitution effect and the last term is the income effect. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
  Table 2 summarizes our empirical approximation of the 
substitution and income effects.  We calculate estimates of the income 
and substitution effects for each price transition and for both price 
treatments.  Further, we offer estimates for two data sets: all the data   15
and just the uncensored data.  We begin by calculating the average 
quantity of punishment demanded before a price change,  0 s , and the 
average after the price change,  1 s .  The difference | 0 s - 1 s | is the average 
observed effect of a price change.  For each price change and  0 s , we 
calculate the income compensation needed to make the original bundle 
just affordable by finding,  00 10 || rs rs π ∆= − .  Multiplying ∆π by our 
estimate of the marginal effect of income on punishment from table 3, 
equation (3) yields our estimate of the income effect of a given price 
change.  We then back out the substitution effect by subtracting the 
income effect from the total observed change.  In the final column of 
table 2 we calculate how much of the total observed change is due to the 
substitution effect. 
  With the exception of the transition from r=4 to r=2, the 
substitution effect explains, on average, more than 90% of the observed 
change in punishment following a price change.  Although the 
magnitudes of the substitution effects are larger in the uncensored data, 
so are the observed changes.  Therefore, the relative size of the 
substitution effect remains about 90% of the observed change.  In other 
words the income effect is relatively small and the substitution effect is 




At the beginning of this paper we pointed out that, while laboratory 
experiments in economics have provided more puzzles than answers, we 
should not be too quick to conclude that the standard methodology of 
economics is inherently flawed.  The results of the current experiment 
give us hope that after documenting and understanding anomalies like 
social preferences, economic tools are informative.   16
  Specifically, our analysis has demonstrated three things: One, we 
have replicated and extended the experiments suggesting that the 
average economic decision-maker will, at some personal cost, punish free 
riders who reduce the social efficiency of group interactions.  Adding the 
current evidence to that of a number of other experiments illustrates that 
positing a preference for punishing free riders appears to be a reasonable 
addition to standard, selfish, preferences.  Two, given we accept that 
people prefer to punish free riders, we have shown that the most basic 
economic analysis, the estimation of demand, illustrates that people react 
to price and income changes when they consider punishing free riders just 
as they react to changes in these variables when they consume more 
standard commodities.  Specifically, the demand for punishment slopes 
downward and is relatively inelastic with respect to price and income.  
Third, we have shown that punishers are sensitive to both the price of 
punishment and the fact that more income allows one to punish more 
severely.  However, decomposing the effect of a price change, we see that 
most of the change in punishment is due to substitution; changes in real 
income play only a small role.   17
Appendix – Participant Instructions 
 
You have been asked to participate in an experiment.  For participating 
today and being on time you have been paid $5.  You may earn an 
additional amount of money depending on your decisions in the 
experiment.  This money will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the 
experiment.  When you click the BEGIN button you will be asked for 
some personal information.  After everyone enters this information we 
will start the instructions for the experiment. 
During the experiment we will speak in terms of Experimental 
Monetary Units (EMUs) instead of Dollars. Your payoffs will be 
calculated in terms of EMUs and then translated at the end of the 
experiment into dollars at the following rate: 25 EMUs = 1 Dollar. 
In addition to the $5.00 show-up fee, each participant receives a 
lump sum payment of 10 EMUs at the beginning of the experiment. 
  The experiment is divided into 15 different periods.  In each 
period participants are divided into groups of 4.  The composition of the 
groups will change randomly at the beginning of each period.  This 
means that in each period your group will consist of different 
participants. 
 




At the beginning of every period participants receive a 25 EMU 
endowment. In stage one participants decide how much of their 25 EMUs 
to contribute to a group project and how much to keep for themselves.  
Participants’ payoffs are determined by the total contribution of their 
specific group and how much they individually keep.   18
  To record their decisions, participants will type EMU amounts in 
two text-input boxes, one for the group project labeled GROUP 
ALLOCATION and one for themselves labeled PRIVATE 
ALLOCATION.  These boxes will be yellow.  Once a participant makes 
a decision, he or she will record his or her decision by clicking on the 
green SUBMIT button. 
  After all the participants have made their decisions, you will 
each be informed of your gross earnings for the period. 
 
Participant Gross Earnings will consist of two parts: 
 
(1) Earnings from the Private Allocation. Individuals are the only 
beneficiary of EMUs they keep.  Specifically, each EMU a 
participant keeps increases that person’s earnings by one. 
(2) Earnings from the Group Project.  Each member of a group gets 
the same payoff from the group project regardless of how much 
he or she contributed. The payoff from the group project is 
calculated by multiplying 0.5 times the total EMUs contributed 
by the members of the group. 
 
Participant Gross Earnings can be summarized as follows: 
 
1 ￿ (EMUs you keep) + 0.5 ￿ (Total EMUs contributed by your group) 
 
Let’s discuss three examples. 
 
Example 1:  Say each member of a group contributes 15 of the 25 EMUs. 
In this case, the group total contribution to the project is 4￿15 = 60 
EMUs.  Each group member earns 0.5￿60 = 30 EMUs from the project.  
The gross earnings of each member will then be the number of EMUs   19
kept, 25-15 = 10, plus the earnings from the group project, 30 EMUs, for 
each member.  In total, each member would earn 10+30 = 40 EMUs. 
 
Example 2:  Now say everyone in the group contributes 5 EMUs.  Here 
the group total contribution will be 20 and each member will earn 
0.5￿20 = 10 EMUs from the group project.  This means that the total 
earnings of each member of the group will be 20 (the number of EMUs 
kept) plus 10 (earnings from the group project) which equals 30 EMUs. 
 
Example 3:  Finally, say three group members contribute all their EMUs 
and one contributes none.  In this case, the group total contribution to 
the project is 3￿25 = 75 EMUs.  Each group member earns 0.5￿75 = 
37.5 EMUs from the project.  The three members who contributed 
everything will earn 0+37.5 = 37.5 EMUs and the one member who 




In stage two participants will be shown the allocation decision made by 
one other randomly selected member of their group.  Everyone’s choice 
will be seen by exactly one other group member and the person you see 
is different from the person seeing you.  In addition to seeing another 
group member’s choice, at this stage participants can reduce the earnings 
of the group member they see, if they want to. 
  Participants will be shown how much one member of their group 
kept and how much this person allocated to the group project.   
Participants will also see their own allocation decision and this decision 
will be labeled ‘YOU’.  
  At this point participants will decide how much (if at all) they 
wish to reduce the earnings of the other group member they are seeing.    20
Participants reduce someone’s earnings by typing the number of EMUs 
they wish to spend to reduce that person’s earnings into the input-text 
box that appears below the other group member’s allocation decision.   
  Participants can spend as much of their accumulated earnings as 
they want to reduce the earnings of the other group member.  For each 
EMU spent by a participant the earnings of the other group member will 
be reduced by R EMUs.  The value of R will change during the 
experiment.   
  [Price Decrease]  The experiment is divided into 5 blocks of 3 
periods and the value of R will change every 3 periods according to the 
following sequence {0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4}.  For example, during the first 3 
periods of the experiment R will be 0.25 so spending 1 EMU will reduce 
the other group member’s earnings by 0.25 EMUs.  During the third 
block of periods R will equal 1 and spending 1 EMU will reduce the other 
group member’s earnings by 1 EMU.  During the final block R will equal 
4 and spending 1 EMU will reduce the other group member’s earnings by 
4 EMUs. 
  [Price Increase]  The experiment is divided into 5 blocks of 3 
periods and the value of R will change every 3 periods according to the 
following sequence {4, 2, 1, 0.5, 0.25}.  For example, during the first 3 
periods of the experiment R will be 4 so spending 1 EMU will reduce the 
other group member’s earnings by 4 EMUs.  During the third block of 
periods R will equal 1 and spending 1 EMU will reduce the other group 
member’s earnings by 1 EMU.  During the final block R will equal 0.25 
and spending 1 EMU will reduce the other group member’s earnings by 
0.25 EMUs. 
  Consider this example: suppose someone spends 2 EMUs to 
reduce the earnings of the other group member when R is 0.5.  This 
expenditure reduces the other group member’s earnings by 1 EMU 
(2￿0.5=1).  When participants have finished stage two they will click   21
the blue DONE button. 
 
Participant Net Earnings in each period will be calculated as follows: 
 
(Gross Earnings from Stage One) – (R times the number of 
EMUs spent on reductions directed towards the participant) – 
(the participant’s expenditure on reductions directed at someone 
else). 
 
If you have any questions please raise your hand. Otherwise, click the red 
FINISHED button when you are done reading. 
   22
 













































Increasing Price to Punish
Decreasing Price to Punish
Figure 1 – The evolution of average group contributions over time (note: 
increasing price indicates that the price per sanction increased from 0.25 
to 4 while decreasing price means the opposite). 
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Increasing Price to Punish
Decreasing Price to Punish
Figure 2 – The time path of punishment expenditures (note: this figure 
includes all the cases where players choose to not punish at all and does 
not control for how much free riding occurred). 






























































Figure 3 – The demand for punishment (note: each observation is 
denoted by a number.  The size of the number is weighed by the number 
of identical observations.  The value of the number denotes the average 
contribution of the punishment target for all the identical observations.  
The line is the result of a linear regression of quantity on price). 













Figure 4 – Punishment income and substitution effects (assuming 
punishment is ordinary and normal). 
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Dependent Variable = Quantity of Punishment Inflicted on Target i,t 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 































  -1.24 0.89 0.91 
Target Elasticity
   -0.62  -0.54 
Contribution Elasticity
   0.58  0.50 
Change in Total Elasticity
     0.01 
N  1080 1080 1008 
Wald χ
2, p-value  107, <0.01  208, <0.01  205, <0.01 
 
Notes:   (1)  Each regression is a Tobit and includes individual random 
                 effects. 
(2)  The coefficients are the marginal effect of a change in the  
regressor on the expected value of the observed quantity 
purchased. 
(3) The elasticities are calculated at the regressor means. 
(4) The N in equation (3) is lower because we lose period 1 to 
differencing. 
(5) Significance: * indicates 0.10, ** indicates 0.05, *** indicates 
0.01. 
Table 1 – Calculating the elasticities of demand.   24 
 




















∂  −− • ∆  ∂ 
 
Substitution Effect 
as percentage of 
total change 
0.25 -> 0.50  4.93  1.87  1.23  0.06  3.06  3.00  98% 
0.50 -> 1.00  1.87  0.83  0.94  0.05  1.04  0.99  95% 
1.00 -> 2.00  0.83  0.11  0.83  0.04  0.72  0.68  94% 
Increase 
2.00 -> 4.00  0.11  0  0.22  0.01  0.11  0.10  91% 
4.00 -> 2.00  0.26  0.35  0.52  0.03  0.09  0.06  67% 
2.00 -> 1.00  0.35  1.05  0.35  0.02  0.70  0.68  97% 
1.00 -> 0.50  1.05  2.24  0.53  0.03  1.19  1.16  97% 
Decrease 
0.50 -> 0.25  2.24  6.74  0.56  0.03  4.50  4.47  99% 
Uncensored Data Only 
0.25 -> 0.50  13.30  6.12  3.33  0.17  7.18  7.01  98% 
0.50 -> 1.00  6.12  4.74  3.06  0.15  1.38  1.23  89% 
1.00 -> 2.00  4.74  1.79  4.74  0.24  2.95  2.71  92% 
Increase 
2.00 -> 4.00  1.79  0  3.58  0.18  1.79  1.61  90% 
4.00 -> 2.00  1.56  2.68  3.12  0.16  1.12  0.96  86% 
2.00 -> 1.00  2.68  4.56  2.68  0.13  1.88  1.75  93% 
1.00 -> 0.50  4.56  6.54  2.28  0.11  1.98  1.87  94% 
Decrease 
0.50 -> 0.25  6.54  17.33  1.64  0.08  10.79  10.71  99% 
Table 2 - Decomposing price related punishment changes into substitution and income effects (note:  0 s is the average level of 
punishment before a price change,  1 s is the average level after the change, and π is per period income).  25
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